Introduction
This chapter explores the treatment of fi lm as a cultural object among varied legal subject matter. Film is signi fi cant as an object or industry well beyond its incarnation as popular media. Its role in law is also varied and goes well beyond the subject of a copyright case (as a moving picture) or as an evidentiary proffer (as a video of a criminal confession). My interest in tracing the discussion of fi lm in Supreme Court cases is to map the wide-ranging and diverse relations of fi lm to law -a semiotics of fi lm in the highest US court's jurisprudence -to decouple the notion of fi lm with entertainment or visual truth (Silbey 2004 ) .
Usually, the interdisciplinary study of law and fi lm takes one of three paths. One path is a "law-in-fi lm" approach, which is primarily concerned with the ways in which law and legal processes are represented in fi lm (Chase 1996 (Chase , 2002 .
1 The "law-in-fi lm" approach considers fi lm as a jurisprudential text by asking how law should or should not regulate and order our worlds by critiquing the way it does so in the fi lm (Kamir 2006 ) . The second path is a " fi lm-as-law" approach, which asks how fi lms about law constitute a legal culture beyond the fi lm.
2 This approach pays special attention to fi lm's unique qualities as a medium and asks how its particular ways of world-making shape our expectations of law and justice in our world at large (Silbey 2001 ; Johnson 2000 ) . Writings in the " fi lm-as-law" vein explore the rhetorical power of fi lm to affect popular legal consciousness (Silbey 2001 ) . They also may look closely at fi lm's capacity to persuade us of a particular view of the world, to convince us that certain people are good or bad or guilty or innocent by positioning the fi lm audience as judge or jury (Silbey 2007a, b ) . This " fi lm-as-law" scholarship explains "how viewers are actively positioned by fi lm to identify with certain points of view; to see some groups of people as trustworthy, dangerous, disgusting, laughable; to experience some kinds of violence as normal; to see some lives as lightly expendable" (Buchanan and Johnson 2008 , 33-34; Lucia 2005 ) . In this latter approach, fi lm and law are compared as epistemological systems, formidable social practices that, when combined, are exceptionally effective in de fi ning what we think we know, what we believe we should expect, and what we dare hope for in a society that promises ordered liberty (Silbey 2007a, b ) .
A third approach to fi lm and law explores the many ways fi lm can be used as a legal tool. Increasingly, fi lm is used to enhance policing and investigations (think surveillance cameras, fi lmed crime scenes, interrogations, and confessions) (Id). Film is also used as a species of legal advocacy to augment trial tactics (opening and closing statements or evidentiary proffers) (Sherwin 2011 ) , settlement conferences, or administrative hearings (e.g., clemency videos) (Austin 2006 ) . The study of fi lm 9 The Semiotics of Film in US Supreme Court Cases in this area of law connects the understanding of fi lm as a complex visual rhetoric with the practice of law as an authoritative and persuasive adjudicative mechanism.
This chapter begins a new path of law and fi lm study. As a semiotics of fi lm in law, it explores how fi lm (the linguistic term and cultural object) is meaningful among Supreme Court cases. Quite literally, this chapter explores the system of meaning that is produced by a data set of Supreme Court cases that discuss fi lm. Following Saussurean linguistics, the chapter asserts that " fi lm" does not correspond to a preexisting concept or object outside of the legal case. To the contrary, " fi lm" is understood only in terms of its relation to the discussion of the legal matter in the case and other like cases and, importantly, in terms of its difference from other issues and items discussed in this body of law that are "not fi lm."
3 When analyzed this way, these cases help constitute that which is fi lm in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
One cannot understand fi lm, of course, without contemplating its audience. By de fi nition, fi lm is meaningful because of the manner in which it is experienced. Insofar as the following discussion delineates fi lm as relating to multiple practices and objects in social life, the discussion also draws attention to the ways in which that delineation depends more or less on the court's construction of a fi lm audience. Thus, as much as the below analysis discerns the many ways in which the court perceives the role of fi lm in legal disputes and social life, it also illuminates how the court imagines and reconstitutes through its decisions the evolving forms and signi fi cances of fi lm spectatorship -an interactive public for fi lm in society.
This project contributes to the work on the legal construction of social life and should be interesting to those who wonder how court cases constitute social reality through their legal discourse. 4 It might also be interesting to those fi lm enthusiasts and critics who understand that fi lm is much more than entertainment and perhaps, as such, may also be a problematic conduit of information. Enmeshed in the fabric of society, fi lm is political, commercial, expressive, violent, technologically sophisticated, economically valuable, uniquely persuasive, and, as these cases demonstrate, constantly evolving. 3 For a much more thorough discussion of semiotic analysis and a speci fi c area of law, see Barton Beebe , The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law , 51 UCLA L. R ev. 621, 629-633 ( 2004 ) .
In a given language, all the words which express neighbouring ideas help de fi ne one another's meaning. Each of a set of synonyms like redouter ("to dread"), craindre ("to fear"), avoir peur ("to be afraid") has its particular value only because they stand in contrast with one another. If redouter did not exist, its content would be shared out among its competitors.… So the value of any given word is determined by what other words there are in that particular area of the vocabulary.… No word has a value that can be identi fi ed independently of what else there is in the vicinity. 
Process
The cases for this project were found by searching the Westlaw US Supreme Court database (SCT) for terms that included " fi lm," "video," or "moving picture." This initial search yielded roughly 885 unique results that dated from 1894. 5 In more than half of these cases, the search term occurs solely in the case caption or in a quotation in the case and was not otherwise relevant to the legal issue being adjudicated. These cases were deleted from the data set. Approximately 300 cases remained after this initial fi ltering process was complete.
After reviewing these hundreds of cases, 153 of them contained a discussion of fi lm in which fi lm is relevant as fi lm (and not as something else).
6 These 153 cases were divided into seven categories. Some cases fi t in more than one category. The categories are also porous, overlapping in legal doctrine and citing one another for similar legal principles. The largest two categories concern (1) First Amendment freedoms as they relate to censorship (33 cases) and (2) the interrelation of obscenity law and privacy (44 cases). These two categories contain more than half of the 153 cases. The other categories are (3) search and seizure (14 cases), (4) publicity (6 cases), (5) evidence (11 cases), (6) antitrust (26 cases), and (7) intellectual property (19 cases). Considering these categories as whole, it would be fair to say that fi lm becomes relevant to law and law to fi lm when courts evaluate (1) the contours and importance of First Amendment protections at its margins, (2) the fairness and accuracy of judgments about criminal liability, and (3) the structure of economic relations in terms of an optimal ef fi ciency in market regulation.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss each of these categories in further detail and describe the treatment of fi lm within each category to discern the variations in the signi fi cance of fi lm as a cultural object as well as in the resulting constitution of fi lm audiences. 5 The data set is on fi le with the author and is available for review upon request. 6 Several other categories were created but subsequently removed from the data set because they did not relate suf fi ciently to the question at issue. For example, a category regarding the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created but not considered for this essay because they involved regulation of radio and television programming far more than " fi lm" in any sense of the word. The cases in that category concerned interpreting FCC regulations and the extent of the FCC's power. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. , 440 U.S. 689 (1979); U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp. , 406 U.S. 649 (1972); FCC v. Schreiber , 381 U.S. 279 (1965) . A group of cases focusing on religious freedom mentioned fi lm and fi lm equipment but not to any extent that would illuminate the meaning of fi lm beyond that it is communicative. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. , 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Morches Union Free Sch. Dist. , 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Meek v. Pittenger , 421 U.S. 349 (1975) . Other categories excluded include a miscellaneous criminal category, labor law, civil rights, tax law, jurisdiction, and federal court procedure. 9 The Semiotics of Film in US Supreme Court Cases
Categories of Analysis

First Amendment: Freedom of Expression and Censorship
Between 1915 and 1952, fi lm was not protected as speech under the First Amendment. "It seems not to have occurred to anybody … that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of power [via the censorship of fi lms] …. The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for pro fi t, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded … we think, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion" ( Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio 1915, 236 U.S. 230, 244) . Mutual Film Corporation begins this line of legal analysis in 1915, in which the Supreme Court upholds an Ohio statute that created a board of censors for motion picture fi lms. Recognizing that fi lm is a lucrative and popular business, the court also recognizes that fi lms may be "useful, interesting, amusing, educational and moral" (Id, 241) . Indeed, the court acknowledges fi lm's "power of amusement" that might appeal to "a prurient interest" (Id, 242) , that fi lm is " [v] ivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but … [also] capable of evil" (Id, 244). The court concludes, therefore, that states are within their police powers to "supervise moving picture exhibitions" when "in the interest of public morals" (Id, 242).
The court does not deny that fi lm is a "medium[] of thought," but it says "so are many things … [like] theater, the circus, and all other shows and spectacles" (Id, 243) . The argument comparing the right to exhibit fi lms free from a censor board's approval with right to publish a newspaper article or speak at a political rally "is wrong or strained" the court says ( Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio ) . The court refuses to "extend[] the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the billboards of our cities and towns" (Id). Motion pictures and "other spectacle" are not of a "legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion" (Id, (243) (244) .
In the early years of fi lm, it was not unheard of to compare fi lm to the theater or a circus ( Gibson v. Gunn 1923, 202 ). Film's unruly and unpredictable effect on its audience worried courts, who were charged with controlling the legal proceedings to ensure fairness and stability and applying the law to achieve the same ends. Attempting to discipline the medium of fi lm through censor boards also made sense, given the inherent conservative nature of courts as the last place where innovative technology and cultural revolution would be embraced (Mnookin 1998 ) .
It is nonetheless surprising to consider that the Supreme Court thought fi lm was not suf fi ciently expressive -in the way that print media or public speaking could be -such that burdening it with censorship boards would not frustrate the goal of deliberative democracy that the First Amendment was intended to foster. It is fair to say that the Supreme Court, until it changed its mind in 1952 with Burstyn v. Wilson (1952, 343) , paradoxically thought fi lm pathetically empty in terms of its content and potentially dangerous in terms of its form.
In 1952, the court overrules Mutual Film declaring "motions pictures … an organ of public opinion … designed to entertain as well as inform" (Id, 501). The court has not changed its mind on the force or content of fi lm. The Supreme Court acknowledges that "motion pictures [may] possess a greater capacity for evil," but that "the line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right (a free press). Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fi ction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine" (Id, (501) (502) .
What has changed? The court mentions the incorporation of the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and the advent of sound fi lm in 1926. It does not mention the popular cinematic movements -fi lm noir and classical Hollywood -both well developed and appreciated by 1952. Nor does it mention the newsreel fi lms covering wartime events that were shown before feature fi lms, by that time regular occurrences. Indeed, the court seems to accept without analysis what it rejected in Mutual Film : that "motion pictures are a signi fi cant medium for the communication of ideas" (Id, 501 (Stone et al. 1996 (Stone et al. , 1226 .
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These and other in fl uences can be read into Burstyn to explain the overruling of Mutual Film and Burstyn 's recharacterization of fi lm as unprotected because it is a mere "medium of thought" resembling a circus to protected speech because it is a "signi fi cant medium for communication of ideas." This may seem like a too subtle shift in language on which to lay much emphasis, but the transformation in effect cannot be overstated. Where in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century the transformative power of fi lm was cause to censor, that same power in the middle of the century was reason the government could not control fi lm unless exceptional circumstances were present (Stone, 504) . What changed appears not to be fi lm's qualities (in both cases fi lm can be trivial and profound, dangerous and useful). The court was broadening the First Amendment's protective reach, discussing its application more frequently in the context of national security, complex commercial relations, and a diversifying cultural milieu. Film bene fi ted from this lively debate. What changed was the perception that judges (or state censor boards) were not always the optimal evaluators of whether or not a fi lm's content (or other expressive speech) is worthy of dissemination. Film being a subcategory of a growing volume of valuable and public speech, what changed was an appreciation for the acumen of ( fi lm) audiences and their capacity to judge for themselves. 
Obscenity and Privacy Concerns
The obscenity and privacy cases turn this analysis on its head. Obscenity is not protected speech under the First Amendment. This branch of US constitutional law is notoriously vague. Applying the standards for obscenity consistently is challenging and the reasons for the low protection (if any protection) debated. Nonetheless, the cases that evaluate allegedly obscene fi lm -pornographic fi lms -are consistent in the manner they treat and discuss the fi lmic nature of the speech. Whereas in the above section, fi lm evolves into an expressive medium worthy of First Amendment protection, it can too easily be categorized as obscene to lose protection altogether. This is potentially the case because fi lm's peculiar mechanism -its indexicality and exceptional capacity for verisimilitude -renders obscene fi lms more like actions than speech (and thus outside the ambit of the First Amendment's protection of speech).
At fi rst, reading through the obscenity cases, it seems that most state laws restricting pornographic fi lms are upheld and those restricting other forms of alleged pornography (print media) fair worse under constitutional scrutiny. Digging deeper, this is not true. But there is something about pornographic fi lms that encourages the court to take a closer look at the state's regulation and assess it in light of the facts. There is a sense from these cases that fi lm does something different than other media. In contrast to allegedly pornographic novels that require elucidation and interpretation (and therefore are less likely to be low-value speech), the court speaks of the fi lms as "the best evidence of what they represent" ( Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton 1973, 413 ) such that their value should be obvious upon viewing.
12 Consider Justice Stewart's famous quote: "I know [hard core pornography] when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that" ( Jacobellis v. Ohio 1964, 378) ; or the much ridiculed job for the justices of taking the pornographic fi lms into their chambers for a feature-length viewing. Experiencing the fi lm is necessary to an evaluation, but even then, the evaluation is instinctive. The court goes on to say that expert testimony is usually unnecessary because "hard core pornography … can and does speak for itself" (Id, 197) . The court nonetheless seems to think that fi lms do not speak all that much -at least not in the "expressive speech" kind of way. Instead, fi lms; they intrude -especially obscene fi lms. This is the very reason obscenity is left unprotected in the fi rst place. If "'speech' for First Amendment purposes is de fi ned by the idea of cognitive content, of mental effect, of a communication designed to appeal to the intellectual process … [and] hard core pornography is designed to produce a purely physical effect, … a pornographic item is in a real sense a sexual surrogate….
[Thus] hardcore pornography is sex, [not speech]" (Schauer 1979 ) . If fi lm is the most direct transposition of that which it represents, no wonder pornographic fi lms are more highly scrutinized. Courts see themselves as evaluating acts not expression and, therefore, more free to uphold the state restriction.
Indeed, most of the obscene fi lm cases deal with the intrusion of the fi lm in the community: whether if played at a drive in, offended community members could easily avert their eyes ( Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville 1975, 422) , or whether the adult-only theater could be shuttered because of the exogenous effects of the theater on the otherwise non-consenting community ( Paris Adult Theaters v. Slaton 1973) . Much of the debate over pornographic fi lms since the World War I concerned the possible correlation between obscene material and crime. The famous Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography was cited frequently by the court in these cases as a justi fi cation for states to regulate commercial obscenity (Id, 58). As early as 1920, there was public concern at the growing number of pornographic fi lms ( U. S. v. Alpers 1950, 338) Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not. ( Paris Adult Theaters v. Slaton 1973, 59) 14 These fi lms intrude only because they are in public -movie houses being places of public accommodation. And of course speech seeking protection is by its very nature public as well. Only when the fi lm is brought into the privacy of one's home do the scales tip in favor of protection because it has become, by nature of the private space, unobtrusive. Even then, however, the fi lm does not magically become protected speech. The private space merely adds a layer of protection from scrutiny because, presumably, it protects the community from any harm.
Privacy is the counterpoint to obscenity. When the issue is the showing of an allegedly obscene fi lm in a movie house or drive-in, or even when it is being transported as an article of commerce ( U. S. v. Orito 1973, 413) , the judges feel free to evaluate the fi lmic expression as obscene or not. When the fi lm is shown privately, the focus shifts from whether the speech is of the intellect or prurient to whether a state, in controlling this speech (whether or not of value), is intolerably intruding into a person's fundamental privacy. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969) , the defendant was convicted of possessing obscene fi lms under a state law that prohibited the possession of all obscene matter. In this case, the court famously quotes the origins of the right to privacy in one's home, the right "as against the government … to be let alone," "to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations" (Id, 564).
15 Whereas Brandeis in this quote from Olmstead may or may not have been thinking of the newest visual technology as safeguarding a "man's spiritual nature," the Stanley Court must be so thinking as they af fi rm the defendant's right to possess obscene fi lms that are otherwise illegal to manufacture and distribute. The court does so, however, by elevating the status of the fi lm to "the contents of [a] library" (Id, 565) and by accusing the state of Georgia of attempting "to control the moral content of a person's thoughts." "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds" (Id). Whereas in public, fi lms are acts -they can intrude on our person, our serenity -in private, they are great books, or, at least, they are enough like great books that while potentially unconventional or objectionable are nonetheless off limits to the court's judgment. 16 The court goes on to say that the Constitution's "guarantee is not con fi ned to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.… And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than which it is unconvincing. Nor is it relevant that … the particular fi lms before the Court are arguably devoid of any ideological content. The line between the transmission of ideas and mere entertainment is much too elusive for this court to draw, if indeed such a line can be drawn at all. Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts." Stanley v. Ga. , 566. This does not apply to cases of the possession of child pornography where the fi lm is again seen as an "act" rather than "expression" because of what it has done to the child. Here again, we see a shift from the court as protector of a public by regulating acts to the court recognizing the capacity of the public -here in private -to decide for itself. 17 Necessarily, the court's construction of the fi lm audience evolves. As the century progresses and fi lm (and pornography) becomes disseminated more widely, the court appears to be tolerating more of it by trusting audiences to do the same. The court does so, while still reserving the power to control the most severe form of pornography by declaring those fi lm renditions acts not speech, but not without close scrutiny of the fi lm itself. As we will see later, this correlates to twenty-fi rst century thinking about fi lm as evidence in criminal cases (such as fi lmed confessions or surveillance fi lm), where the act caught on fi lm is not expressive or subject to interpretation but more like the thing itself. It therefore speaks for itself, unmediated by representational frames. 
Search and Seizure
The category of cases concerning the lawful search and seizure of fi lms is an iteration of the above themes but distinguishes fi lm as a cultural object in yet another way. Obscene fi lm is categorically unlike other kinds of contrabandsuch as narcotics or a weapon -which the court says are "dangerous in themselves" ( Roaden v. Ky, 1973) . This makes sense only, however, if we understand fi lm to have two components: a physical embodiment and an expressive existence. 19 Otherwise, what would distinguish one form of contraband, cocaine, from another kind of contraband, hard-core pornography? Both may be illegal; both may be harmful. But fi lms are expressive in ways that narcotics are not. So we have in these cases a repetition of the notion of fi lm as expressive and, therefore, specially treated by courts because they fall within the First Amendment ambit. But we also have in these cases, as we did in the obscenity cases, a concern about how to properly police the line between legal and illegal (constitutionally protected speech and unprotected speech acts ) and concerns over who does that policing, how, and when. 9 The Semiotics of Film in US Supreme Court Cases
The divisibility of fi lm into a physical object and intangible expression is particularly clever in the search and seizure cases (to say nothing about the fact that it is true as a matter of intellectual property). 20 The court draws on national history to remind us that the "use by the government of power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new" ( Walter v. U.S 1980) . 21 In this way, lawful possession of an object (the fi lm reel) must be distinct from the possession of its contents (the images on the reel or the story told by it). Otherwise, the government could use its police powers to control the dissemination of expression with which it disagreed under the auspices of emergency seizure of tangible goods. "The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for sti fl ing liberty of expression" ( Marcus v. Search Warrant , 729) .
The duality of fi lm (as a tangible object and an intangible expression) manifests in the search and seizure cases in terms of the warrant requirement. "When contents of the package are books or other materials arguably protected by the First amendment and when the basis of the seizure is disapproval of the message contained therein, it is especially important that [the warrant] requirement be scrupulously observed" ( Walter v. U.S 1980 , 655) . What does this mean? It means more than that a warrant must issue before a search can be effectuated. It means that the warrant must include both the fi lm itself and the reason for viewing it, viewing being an independent search for which probable cause must exist (Id, 655) . It means that a warrant must be supported by particular facts setting forth the basis of searching the contents of the fi lm in addition to possessing the fi lm itself ( Lee Art Theater Inc. v. Va. 1968) . Moreover, where the seizure of the fi lm includes both the tangible item and the intangible expression (i.e., a copy of the fi lm and a viewing of it), seizure must be for the basis of preserving evidence for trial and accompanied by an opportunity for prompt post-seizure judicial determination of obscenity (or other basis for illegality).
22 That is to say, the court requires a preliminary assessment of the content of the fi lm -the nature of its expressivity and whether it is likely protected speech or not -before a warrant may issue at all. All of these requirements safeguard the evil of a prior restraint on speech.
Because there is no exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment when seizing allegedly obscene material (in contrast to the case of seizing weapons or narcotics) ( Roaden v. Ky , , the method by which the determination that a warrant is necessary is much debated by the court. Here, the above-described aspects of the obscenity cases come to the fore. Except in the case of a large-scale seizure, an 20 See supra note 19 and the discussion infra of intellectual property cases in the main text. 21 Citing Marcus v. Search Warrant , 367 U.S. 717, 724. 22 Heller v. N.Y. , 413 U.S. 483 (1973) . "Seizing fi lms to destroy them or to block their distribution or exhibition is a very different matter from seizing a single copy of a fi lm for the bona fi de purpose of preserving it as evidence in a criminal proceeding, particular where … there is no showing or pretrial claim that the seizure of the copy prevented continuing exhibition of the fi lm." Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. N.Y. , 442 U.S. 319, 328 (1979) (citations omitted). adversary proceeding to determine probable cause for the search and seizure of the fi lm is not necessary ( N.Y v. P.J. Video 1986) . But the determination of probable cause for that search must be made by a neutral, independent, and detached judge ( Heller v. N.Y, 488) . The determination can be based on having viewed the fi lm in a theater before issuing warrant (Id, 488-89, n. 4) or after reviewing particularized factual assertions on the warrant request, which are not conclusory and provide the judge with adequate reasons for fi nding probable cause to declare the fi lms illegal ( Walter v. U.S, . The goal here is to enable the judge "to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity" ( Heller v. N.Y, 489) . These cases tell us, then, that the viewing of a fi lm is a kind of search. This in itself is an interesting proposition. Viewing a fi lm is both a search of a possession and a search of a mind; at least this must be true if we understand these cases to be about protecting freedom of thought and freedom of one's person (the intangible and the tangible). Viewing becomes a kind of personal intrusion (another interesting proposition) one against which the Constitution protects under certain circumstances.
These cases also tell us that a judge's viewing is not as harmful or intrusive as an FBI or police search because of the focus and independence the judge brings to the task. The court explicitly says that a judge's review of a fi lm for purposes of probable cause is less troubling than an FBI or police viewing of the fi lm, calling the latter inherently harmful ( Walter v. U.S, 657) . 23 It is as if the judge is a doctor viewing the patient's naked body -detached and impersonal -and the police of fi cer is a voyeur or interloper -lewd and unrestrained. Judges, here, are the best kind of critic, necessary and fair.
24 Given the instinctive mode by which judges have been known to interpret expression as obscene or not (behind closed doors, "I know it when I see it") and the fact that judges are unlike the mass of popular audiences in their moving-going ways (Silbey 2008 ) , this aspect of the search and seizure cases distinguishing judges from other kinds of law enforcement of fi cers is puzzling. It nonetheless comports with other lines of cases in which judges are deemed the most appropriate gatekeeper for evaluating the extent of the state's use of force.
As much as these search and seizure cases rede fi ne the nature of fi lm (as an object and an expression) and of search (as a physical and mental intrusion), they are also about the nature of the viewer and searcher (the judge, police, or other state actor). Here again, fi lm audiences are inseparable from the construction of fi lm as a cultural object with political and social signi fi cance. Given the narrowed focus of the fi lm audience here -judge or police -as opposed to the more diverse public from previous categories above, these cases af fi rm judges' conceit in their ability to interpret fi lm astutely. Whether there is an alternative to judges as fi lm critics, "Who else would decide whether the fi lm was lawfully seized?" is a question I have discussed elsewhere (Silbey 2004 ) . Suf fi ce it to say, there are alternatives. The court's default in these cases to preferring themselves over other decision-makers or institutions speaks to their belief in fi lm's exceptionality as well as to their own. 
Publicity
Courts are often called to determine whether the press' use of fi lm to titillate rather than to inform violates due process. The cases about restrictions on pretrial publicity conceive of fi lm fi rst as a conduit of information -about the accused, about the crime, about the proceedings that will judge both -and second as a game changer, an ostensible neutral observer that nevertheless effects what is being observed.
The fi lms in these publicity cases start out being made and distributed to expose a problem or solve a crime. In Wiseman v. Massachusetts (1970) , the documentary fi lmmaker Frederick Wiseman appealed to the Supreme Court a judgment from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) that enjoined the commercial distribution to general audiences of his fi lm Titicut Follies about life in the Bridgewater State Hospital for the criminally insane. The Massachusetts SJC enjoined the fi lm's distribution ostensibly to protect the privacy of the inmates, despite the very obvious bene fi t that would ensue from a public airing of the inhumane conditions at the prison. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Justice Harlan dissented from that denial, and, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote that because "the conditions in public institutions are matters which are of great interest to the public generally," "there is the necessity for keeping the public informed as a means of developing responsible suggestions for improvement and of avoiding abuse of inmates who for the most part are unable intelligently to voice any effective suggestion or protest" ( Wiseman v. Mass 1970 , 961) . They argued that the informational quality of the fi lm far outweighed any privacy harm its exposure would cause the inmates. Indeed, neither court doubted the accuracy of the fi lm as a conduit for factual information.
There are other cases that af fi rm this perception of fi lm as conduit. In Chandler v. Florida (1981) , the court af fi rmed a criminal conviction despite the public broadcast of the trial. In this case, the court highlighted the state of Florida's implementing guidelines for fi lm coverage of a judicial proceeding. Film equipment "must be remote from the courtroom. Film, videotape, and lenses may not be changed while the court is in session. No audio recording of conferences between lawyers, between parties and counsel, or at the bench is permitted. The judge has sole and plenary discretion to exclude coverage of certain witnesses, and the jury may not be fi lmed" ( Chandler v. Fla 1981, 566) . In this case, the fi lm is welcomed because it would be a conduit of information and not a distorting in fl uence.
The Chandler Court explicitly contrasted the methodical and unobtrusive fi lming of the criminal trial in its case with the "Roman circus" or "Yankee Stadium" atmosphere admonished in Estes v. Texas (1965, 532) , where due process was found to have been denied. In Estes , a "mass of wires" and "at least 12 camera men with their equipment" and "photographers roaming at will" turned the courtroom into a "forest of equipment" (Id, 553). At one point, the court pointed out that the rebroadcasting of a hearing from the case was in place of the "late movie" (Id, 537). The Estes Court accuses the fi lming as being an "insidious in fl uence" that runs counter to the solemn purpose of the trial which is to ascertain the truth (Id, 540-41). In a case 10 years earlier, Rideau v. Louisiana , a fi lmed jailhouse confession that aired on television three times prior to the trial rendered the subsequent judicial proceeding "a hollow formality" ( Rideau v. LA 1963, 373) . The fi lmed confession became the de facto trial by which the accused was judged. In both Estes and Rideau , the fi lming was transformative -it failed in its role as conduit -and frustrated justice.
Chandler reiterates that fi lming a trial does not inherently deny due process. Cases before and since Estes con fi rm that the fi lm may render the judicial proceedings an uncontrolled "carnival" ( Murphy v. Fla 1975, 421) or "spectacle" ( Rideau v. La, 725) and, as such, the jury may be poisoned against the accused. As with Wiseman , where the court was asked to assess the extent of the intrusion by the fi lm into its subject's private lives, in the case of fi lmed judicial proceedings, the court is charged with assessing the "extent and degree of saturation of the public mind with the TV fi lms" to determine whether pretrial publicity such as fi lmed interviews with the defendant, victim, attorneys, or politicians rendered the subsequent trial unfair ( Whitney v. Fla 1967, 389) . Additionally, courts must determine based on the orderliness and invisibility of the camera crew whether the fi lming had an undue in fl uence on witnesses, the defendant, or the jury ( Chandler v. Fla, . In Chandler , the court discusses studies and amici briefs that discuss the potential adverse psychological impact on trial participants that are associated with fi lming the proceedings (Id, . It also praises the safeguards Florida put in place to minimize negative impact and to amplify the public good that fl ows from broadcasting criminal trials (improving con fi dence in the judicial system). Concluding that there is no inherent violation of due process in the fi lming of a criminal trial because fi lm itself is not inherently harmful, courts must nonetheless assess where on the line the particular fi lm at issue falls -mere conduit or injurious meddler.
Of course fi lm is neither, just like language is neither. Film, like language, is constitutive of the social situation. Nonetheless, in these cases on publicity, the court seems to worry mostly about fi lm's physical embodiment -the space it takes up or intrudes upon -and not about its expressive or constitutive force. When it becomes physically more tangled in the proceeding (with wires, lighting, or camera crew) or when it physically dominates the proceeding's representation in the media (with repetitious playbacks of dramatic moments of the case), the court fl inches at fi lm's presence. Otherwise, it is like a conveyor belt, neutrally moving information from speaker to listener, broadcaster to audience member.
Evidence
Judges are not necessarily the best judges of fi lm. We know this because of the naïve realism judges inject into their opinions assessing the truth or transparency of fi lm content despite the history of fi lm as an art that counsels otherwise (Silbey 2005 ) . And yet, courts are called to interpret fi lms regularly, most often as either obscene speech or as evidentiary proffers: a criminal confession, an interrogation, a crime scene, a surveillance fi lm, an FMRI, or a fi lmed deposition (Silbey 2008 ) . The Supreme Court decides cases about this latter kind of evidence less frequently, but it has addressed fi lm evidence enough over the past 100 years to raise alarm bells.
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How does the court consider fi lm evidence when it has to decide whether it was properly admitted into the trial? This is different from the obscenity cases where the fi lm is the object to be assessed -its relevance undisputed -the determination being whether the fi lm is obscene or not. In the evidence cases, the court assesses the fi lm precisely for its relevance (Is it probative of a fact at issue?) and for its potential prejudice (Does it affect the jurors emotionally and, therefore, degrade their rational deliberation?). The evidence cases are therefore like the publicity cases in which the fi lm has the potential to be a heckler out to spoil the fairness of the game.
But these evidence cases share something with the obscenity cases as well. Recall from the obscenity cases that the court understands fi lm to act on us when it is less expressive (less open to interpretation) and more prurient (arousing). In these instances, it is less protected and can be regulated without violating the First Amendment. With the cases on fi lm evidence, the court also worries that the fi lm will act on us, will trigger emotional responses rather than rational ones, and will therefore cloud our judgment. Unlike the obscenity cases, however, in the cases on fi lm evidence, the court provides a basis for its judgment that fi lm evidence may prejudice the proceeding. Because the fi lm is so much like real life, so traumatizing with its "in your face" quality, the court fears that audiences will see fi lm representations of pain or violence, experience it as if live before their very eyes, and will seek vengeance, whether or not punishment is warranted under the law.
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The court holds inconsistent positions on fi lm evidence. At times, the court appears capable of recognizing fi lmic conventions, its manipulative effect, and its need for interpretation. At other times, the court appears seduced by fi lm's reality effect despite its inherent partiality and ambiguity (Silbey 2005 ) . Most recently, in Scott v. Harris , the court fell for a trick that has seduced moviegoers for more than a century: it treated fi lm as a depiction of reality. The court held that a Georgia police of fi cer did not violate a fl eeing suspect's Fourth Amendment rights when the of fi cer intentionally caused a car crash, rendering the suspect a quadriplegic ( Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372 (2007) ). The court's decision relied almost entirely on the fi lm of the high-speed police chase taken from a "dash cam," a video camera mounted on the dashboard of the pursuing police cruiser (Id, 379). Although obviously not the fi rst time the Supreme Court has acted as fi lm critic, 28 Scott v. Harris may be the fi rst time the Supreme Court disregards all other evidence and declares the fi lm version of the disputed event as the unassailable truth for the purposes of summary judgment. Indeed, the Supreme Court said that, despite the contrary stories told by the opposing parties in the lawsuit, the only story to be believed was the one the video told: "We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself" (Id, 393, n. 5). And then, for the fi rst time in history, the Supreme Court linked video evidence to the slip opinion on its website to encourage people to "see" for themselves. 29 In Scott v. Harris , the court fell victim to the widespread and dangerous belief -to the degree of enshrining this belief in our national jurisprudence -that fi lm captures reality. Here, the worries the court expressed about fi lm's undue in fl uence for other fact fi nders haunt its own assessment of fi lm. There are other ironies in the court's jurisprudence on fi lm evidence: the perception of fi lm as potentially misleading and prejudicial, on the one hand, and as the conveyor of the most accurate account of the truth, on the other. What happened to fi lm being expressive and creative, like a deep thought (whether despicable or not)? What happened to the fi lm having a dual existence -real and intangible -where form and function intertwine but may be analyzed independently? Is fi lm the epitome of reality and truth or is it so raw that it is for a judge's eyes only? According to these cases on fi lm evidence, it may be both. And yet this is not what we understand about fi lm according to its development as an art form. In these cases where fi lm is assessed as evidence under the more prejudicial than probative standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, unlike other evidence such as testimony or business records, fi lm is divorced from its context and history and is either assessed as a street sign that needs no interpretation or as a weapon that is safe only in certain hands. As should be clear by now, however, fi lm 28 See supra discussions in main text, particularly those assessing allegedly obscene fi lms to determine whether they con fl ict with contemporary community standards. See also Miller v. Cal. , 413 U.S. 15, 18-30 (1973) (discussing the evolution of the standards that the court employs when reviewing obscenity cases). 29 See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372 (2007). The video is available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ media/media.aspx 30 This was not the fi rst time the court was taken in by fi lm despite other evidence at trial. See C ox v. State of La. , 379 U.S. 536, 547 (1965) . 31 Transcript of Oral Argument, 45. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter in the 8-1 decision and the only Justice who recognized that the fi lm was not the whole story. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. at 389-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
is much more than a sign, and it is hardly a lethal weapon. The very meaning of fi lm as a cultural object is contested in the court's own jurisprudence. Why the fi lm's message would be so unambiguous in this particular case is therefore perplexing, to say the least.
Antitrust
Even in the cases where fi lm is considered primarily for its commercial element, fi lm's character takes on complex dimensions. Upon fi rst read, the cases in the antitrust category discuss fi lm and the fi lm industry in light of its substantial contributor to the national economy. It is no surprise, then, that fi lm (as a cultural object and practice) is largely considered an "item of commerce" in a large number of Supreme Court cases in this category for the purpose of determining anticompetitive practices. One of the earliest antitrust cases that concerns "motion picture fi lms" equates fi lmmaking and distribution with the "manufacturing [of a] commodity" ( Binderup v. Pathe Exchange 1923, 291, 309) . At the conclusion of the case, in comparing the fi lm industry to other growing or developed national industries, the court says the "transactions here are essentially the same as those involved in the foregoing cases, substituting the word ' fi lm' for the word 'live stock,' or 'cattle,' or 'meat.' Whatever difference exists is of degree and not in character" (Id, 311). After so many cases in which fi lm is considered a thing apart -exceptional as a medium of communication or cultural object -it is a relief to see the court considers fi lm like so many other kinds of everyday practices.
This characterization of fi lm as an article of commerce does not change, but rather is augmented approximately 20 years later when the courts start to consider the copyrightability of fi lm in their antitrust analyses. More will be said about the relationship between fi lm and intellectual property below, but suf fi ce to say that in the antitrust context, the fact that fi lms are copyrighted -and therefore are monopolies of a sort -can raise the scrutiny (or at least alter the analysis) over the reasonableness of the restraint of trade and the concern for anticompetitive business relationships ( Interstate Circuit v. U.S., Paramount Pictures Distrib. 1939, 208, 230) . In most of these cases, the copyrightability of fi lm only furthers the argument that the fi lm and the fi lm industry are well propertied and commercially and socially valuable. Restraint of trade in the fi lm business, no more so in the livestock business, may run afoul of the Sherman Act. "An agreement [found to be] illegal because it suppresses competition is not any less so because the competitive article is copyrighted" (Id, 230) .
But then a kind of fi lm exceptionalism eventually does rear its head, as it did in other categories of cases. In the antitrust cases, fi lm is accorded a special kind of economic status because of the fl uctuation in ticket price depending on whether it is a fi rst-run or second-run fi lm. Complicated licensing arrangements attempting to restrict fi rst-run fi lms to speci fi c, noncompeting geographic regions and venues and to restrict the prices of tickets for fi rst-run and second-run shows were met with disapproval. 32 The combination of the drawing power of a new fi lm (akin to the drawing power of a live prize fi ght) ( U. S. v. Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y 1955, 236) combined with its "legal and economic uniqueness" as a copyrighted object made for a distinct analysis under antitrust law ( U. S. v. Loews 1962, 38, 48) . Whether in a theater or on television, the presentation of a fi lm to a live audience garnered "suf fi cient economic power" that imposing a restraint on the competition in the fi lm product became per se suspect (Id, 48). As one case reads, "forcing a television station that wants 'Gone with the Wind' to take 'Getting Gertie's Garter' as well is taking undue advantage of the fact that to television as well as motion picture viewers there is but one 'Gone with the Wind'" (Id, 48) . This per se rule based on the patented or copyrighted nature of the tying product was not abrogated until 2006 ( See Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink 2006, 28) . For nearly all of the twentieth century, fi lm held a special status in antitrust law as a particularly economically powerful product.
This fi lm exceptionalism continues further in the antitrust cases in terms of the Sherman Act's reach over the fi lm industry. When analyzing fi lm as an article of commerce, the court discusses fi lm as both a local and interstate phenomenon. The Sherman Act regulates only interstate commerce. Some fi lm industry players seeking exemption from antitrust regulations therefore argued that fi lm is "a local affair" ( U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co 1945, 348) . 33 Sometimes the defendants also argued that fi lm is like a sports event or a theatrical attraction, "intangible and evanescent" and, therefore, cannot be regulated under Congress' commerce power ( U.S. v. Shubert , 227 n. 9). In both situations, the court rejected defendants' arguments concluding that the object of fi lm cannot be divorced from its industry, which is highly complex and nationwide in scope ( U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co. , . In so doing, the court drew an intriguing distinction between the professional baseball industry (which was left unregulated) and vaudeville theater business (which was subject to the Sherman Act). Where the business of baseball was granted immunity despite the interstate travel of players because travel was "a mere incident, not the essential thing" in baseball, for vaudeville, traveling theatrical productions was "more important" to the business ( U. S. v. Shubert , . In other words, fi lm was more like vaudeville than baseball. "This court has never held that the theatrical business is not subject to the Sherman Act" and with that held that unlike major league baseball, the fi lm industry would not be categorically exempt from antitrust laws (Id, 230). The fi lm industry's complicated structure and fi lm's unique combination of a mass popular appeal with its reproducible embodiment made it a focal point of antitrust analysis. 32 See, for example, U. S. v. Paramount Pictures , 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Shine Chain Theaters v. U.S. , 334 U.S. 110 (1948) . 33 See also U. S. v. Shubert , 348 U.S. 222, 227 (1955) .
Intellectual Property
Overlap exists between the treatment of fi lm in antitrust cases and in the intellectual property cases. This is because some of the cases are simply the same. But it is also because the commercial aspect of intellectual property directly engages the concern with commercial competition in antitrust law. In many of the intellectual property cases, fi lm is either a stand-alone species of intangible property (as a copyrighted work) or is restricted to being played on a patented machine. Either way, fi lm facilitates a revenue stream, and policy dictates its protection as intangible personal property. 34 In Dowling v. United States , the Supreme Court distinguished fi lm as a physical object (which may or may not be owned lawfully) from fi lm as intellectual property (whose legal status is altogether different from that of the physical object) ( Dowling v. U.S. 1985, 207) . In that case, the court had to determine whether the National Stolen Property Act would reach the interstate transportation of infringing copies of Elvis fi lms, among other items. The court held that unauthorized copies (infringing copies) were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" as required by the Act, which has heretofore involved only "physical goods, wares or merchandise" (Id, 217). The Copyright Act codi fi es its own criminal penalties in light of the speci fi c nature of copyright and the particularized harms that fl ow from infringement. To be sure, the court recognized the physical nature of fi lm as fi lm, 35 but in this category of cases regarding intellectual property, the focus on fi lm's value concerns its copyrighted nature or its tie to a patented machine.
There are several cases in this category in which fi lm is discussed speci fi cally in light of the right to make derivative works under copyright law. Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right to "recast, transform, or adapt" their work to make a new "derivative" work. Traditionally, derivative works include translations from one language to another or adaptations of the original expression for a new media (e.g., a novel to a fi lm). Cases of this sort span the entire 100 years of cases contained in the current fi lm data set. As early as 1911, when moving pictures were only 16 years old, the Supreme Court decided a case concerning the fi lmic dramatization of Ben Hur :
The appellant and defendant, the Kalem company, is engaged in the production of movingpicture fi lms, the operation and effect of which are too well known to require description. By means of them anything of general interest from a coronation to a prize fi ght is presented to the public with almost the illusion of reality …. The defendant employed a man to read 34 Eldred v. Ashcroft , 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (Appendix to Opinion of Breyer, J. at B) (discussing how fi lms account for dominant share of export revenues earned by new copyrighted works of potential lasting commercial value) ; Mills Music v. Snyder , 469 U.S. 153, 176-177 (1985) ; Sony Corp of America v. Univ. City Studios , 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. , 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television , 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Educ. Films Corp. of America v. Ward , 282 U.S. 379 (1931); Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles , 261 U.S. 326 (1923); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. , 243 U.S. 502 (1917) . 35 See Eldred v. Ashcroft , 239-40 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing the interest in preserving perishable copies of old copyrighted fi lms).
Ben Hur and to write out such a description or scenario of certain portions that it could be followed in action …. It then caused the described action to be performed, and took negatives for moving pictures of the scenes, from which it produced fi lms suitable for exhibition. These fi lms it expected and intended to sell for use as moving pictures in the way in which such pictures commonly are used. It advertised them under the title "Ben Hur." ( Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. 1911, 22) Holding for copyright owner, the court decided in Kalem that the new fi lm Ben Hur was an infringing derivative work of the book Ben Hur . We see similar discussions in other cases from the same period, one discussing the fi lm version of a poem ( Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles 1923) and another discussing the fi lm version of a play ( Manners v. Morosco 1920) , and in later cases when fi lm versions of books or short stories become particularly lucrative.
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In these cases, analyzing fi lm as a derivative work, the court discusses the derivative fi lm as a distinct expressive form, one that the author of the original work would have wanted to avoid or control. Again, we see the idea of fi lm's exceptionalism structuring the court's analysis. The special features of fi lm -its illusion of reality, its mass produced and mass performed nature -signi fi cantly enhance (or change) the underlying work ( Kalem Co v. Harper Bros. 1911, 60; Manners v. Morosco , 327) . For these reasons, it made sense to the court that the author of the original work would like the right to control fi lm versions of it. These cases also evidence a suspicion and awe of fi lm as it grows both in mass appeal and as a national industry with its increasing specialization. Combined with the early cases discussing the patented machines on which fi lm was played where the court marveled at the power of "talkies" ( Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp. 1935, 464; Altoona Public Theaters v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 1935, 477) , the court's cases in the derivative work area paint a compelling picture of fi lm's emergent cultural and economic dominance as mass entertainment.
Despite fi lm's forceful presence in culture as a medium of expression and national commerce, throughout these cases about intellectual property, fi lm retains its nature as personal property. It is alienable at will and can be exploited only with permission of the owner. Despite its obvious expressive function and the bene fi t derived from disseminating expression, "any copyright owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the work" ( Stewart v. Abend , 229) . This is another way of saying that the property aspect of fi lm dominates over its intellectual aspect. In some instances, the court refuses to limit the monopoly that putative fi lm owners claim over the dissemination of their work despite the personal nature of the property right ( Sony Corp. of America v. Univ. City Studios 1984, 417) . But it has done so only because property lines as drawn by statute are clear and not because of fi lm's expressive value. In the recent case of Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation , the Supreme Court declared that Fox Film, despite making the fi lm at issue, was not entitled to control its subsequent distribution under either copyright or trademark law because the copyright had fallen into the public domain ( Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp . 2003, 23, 35) . The court recognized that the public owed the existence of an important fi lm to a genealogical line of fi lmmakers and contributors, but once the copyright in the fi lmic expression expired, no one had a legal claim to control it. There was nothing left to protect as property, even if the full value of the copyright had not been realized by its originators. The fi lm was relinquished to the public domain for no other reason than its owner was derelict and let the copyright lapse.
These cases on intellectual property and fi lm are interesting inasmuch as they discuss less the intellectual aspect than they do the property aspect of fi lm. Even in the famous case of Sony Corp of America v. University City Studios , in which the court was closely divided over whether home recording of television shows and fi lms was fair use under the Copyright Act, the court focused more on the potential harm to the market in television and fi lm as an economic matter than whether it was in the public interest to facilitate building private fi lm libraries ( Sony Corp. of America v. Univ. City Studios 1984, 417) . Ironically enough, in the category of cases in which fi lm could be analyzed most intricately as both intellectual expression and a tangible good, the court's focus is on the latter, leaving the discussion of fi lm's expressivity to other categories of cases.
Conclusion
This chapter represents a preliminary foray into a semiotics of fi lm and law. It goes without saying that more elaborate analysis can and should be done following this brief exegesis on the assorted treatment of fi lm in US Supreme Court cases. Recently, the Supreme Court decided two new cases in which its discussion manifests many of the varied relationships discussed above between fi lm and commerce, expressive and dangerous speech, truthful evidence and invasive action.
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One of those cases is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010, 876) . At the center of this controversial case is a fi lm called Hillary: The Movie , which described itself as a documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton. The fi lm aimed to expose Senator Clinton's fl aws and dissuade voters from electing her to the Presidency ( Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n 2010, 887) . One question presented by the case was whether a fi lm such as Hillary was "electioneering communication" and "express advocacy or its functional equivalent." Another question presented was whether the kind of speech here -a fi lm made by a political action committee (PAC) and a nonpro fi t corporation and one that would be shown 9 The Semiotics of Film in US Supreme Court Cases facts make fi lm potentially even more powerful as a medium. It is not necessarily fi lm that has changed, but the world and manner in which the fi lm is made and distributed. The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by three other colleagues, recognizes this. Justice Stevens does not say that the fi lm should be restricted within weeks of an election, only that for it to be shown up to and on the day of an election for maximum impact it need to "abjure business contributions or use of the funds in its PAC" (Id, 944, Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens goes on to say:
Let us be clear: [our precedent does not] impl[y] that corporations may be silenced; the FEC is not a 'censor,' and in the years since these cases, corporations have continued to play a major role in national dialogue. Laws such as [those at issue here] target a class of communications that is especially likely to corrupt the political process,… and that may not even re fl ect the views of those who pay for it. Such laws burden political speech, and that is always a serious matter demanding careful scrutiny. But the majority's incessant talk of a 'ban' aims at a straw man…. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners and its own employees. When such restrictions are justi fi ed by a legitimate governmental interest, they do not necessarily raise constitutional problems. (Id) Stevens' dissent recognizes the various degrees of "free" that are part of First Amendment jurisprudence. And he does not differentiate fi lm among them, but instead distinguishes the person or entity who speaks through the fi lm (here a corporation). Calling the majority's application of the First Amendment "wooden" (Id), Stevens recognizes that the First Amendment has come far, expanded in application, and that this is good. But he also cautions that what is at issue here is not the fi lm per se but the wholesale protection of "general treasury electioneering expenditures by corporations" (Id). To him, the fi lm at issue was the output of corporate power and not of individual speech that the majority's First Amendment mythologizes. To Stevens, and the others who signed on to his dissent, the twenty-fi rst century is vastly different from the early to mid-twentieth century precisely because of the magnitude of corporate in fl uence over daily life; corporate entities are not simply aggregates of individual will or ideas. "Films" are not the issue, it is their authors.
Interestingly enough, in this most recent of cases discussing fi lm and speech, the dissent and the majority do not disagree about the fi lm's message or about its forceful way of making meaning. Instead, they disagree because of who is speaking through the fi lm. Both sides agree that fi lm may be uniquely powerful as speech, even exceptionally so. But the court remains divided as to the import of the fi lm's authorship. The majority romanticizes the fi lm as the product of a single entity, with a voice worthy of protecting in a democratic society. The dissent sees the fi lm as a product of a corporation composed of diverse actors and thus as impossibly claiming to represent the uni fi ed voices of the company's shareholders. In Citizens United , fi lm spans the distance between a soapbox speech and a corporate prospectus. The fi lm at issue, Hillary: A Documentary , is of course very much like both of these things. And perhaps this variable and malleable nature of fi lm as a complex speech act accounts for the irreconcilable positions taken by the justices in the case. These cases, taken as a whole, are full of contradictions and puzzles such as this one. They describe a Supreme Court that asserts that it (and other courts) is uniquely capable of evaluating fi lm content but also that fi lm is best left to its audience to interpret. These cases demonstrate that the court recognizes fi lm's diverse and strong economic hold on the national economy because of its mass appeal and complex industry, but also that these facts should not disqualify fi lm from First Amendment protection. Finally, these cases describe an exceptionalism whereby fi lm, although like other ubiquitous market goods and other forms of protected speech, should nonetheless be handled with care, as if it is still not entirely understood in terms of its social and cultural in fl uences. This fi nal point recalls the prescient statement of Vladimir Lenin that "of all the arts, for us the cinema is the most important." 39 To be sure, these cases from the US Supreme Court recognize the extraordinary in fl uence of fi lm on politics, culture, and economic life in the United States. It is not mere fringe entertainment, but deeply part of the fabric of our everyday life. It will be interesting to see whether in the next 100 years of cinema the court's special care of fi lm is replaced, and if so, with what.
